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STATEMENT OF THOMAS R. DONAHUE, 
SECRETARY-TREASURER, AFL-CIO 
BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF 
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
September 8, 1994 
The focus of today's hearing is on the Commission's second 
charge, which is to submit recommendations for changes in the 
"present legal framework and practices of collective bargaining." 
It will not surprise you to know that the AFL-CIO has a number of 
proposals in this regard. But before addressing these specifics, 
we think it is essential to begin with the first principles that 
animate the national labor policy. 
Almost sixty years ago, in enacting the National Labor 
Relations Act, Congress declared it to be the "policy of the United 
States" to "encourage the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining" and to "protect the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association ... for the purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their employment." That remains the point of the 
NLRA today. 
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Why encourage collective bargaining? Simply stated, because 
there is an overriding national interest in assuring fair and 
decent labor standards and the collective bargaining system is the 
surest means to that end that does not require further government 
regulation. 
Left to its own devices, the invisible hand of the market 
treats working men and women as just one more factor of production 
— "human capital" — whose "return" depends on the laws of supply 
and demand. Those most desperate, and thus least demanding, 
effectively establish the labor standards for all. These "market" 
standards do not necessarily include decent wages and benefits, 
safe and healthful workplaces, or humane working conditions. 
The collective bargaining system provides a means of tempering 
market competition with human values through private decision-
making. By joining together in a group and by dealing with their 
employers on a collective basis, working men and women are able to 
realize a degree of market power that a single member of the 
employee group, acting individually, cannot realize. Through 
collective bargaining workers can take wages and working conditions 
out of competition and can establish labor standards responsive to 
basic human needs. And, through collective bargaining, working men 
and women can participate in shaping the terms and conditions of 
their employment rather than being forced to acquiesce in their 
employer's unilateral workplace decisions. 
In all these ways, collective bargaining works to lift up the 
economy and to further the public interest. And, as Congress 
> 
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intended, for many years the NLRA's protection of the bargaining 
system generated just that result. 
Through collective bargaining, the "bad, low paying" jobs of 
a prior generation — factory jobs, construction jobs, railroad 
jobs and the like — became the "good, decent paying" jobs that 
enabled hard working Americans to buy a home, to raise a family, 
and or send their kids to college. Collective bargaining made 
health care affordable for most working Americans by establishing 
employer-paid health insurance as a standard employee benefit. 
Collective bargaining gave working men and women the chance to 
retire at a decent income by developing employer-provided pensions 
as another standard employee benefit. And through collective 
bargaining, a myriad of other labor standards were established that 
we take for granted today. 
At its post World War II peak, the collective bargaining 
system directly established the terms and conditions of employment 
for 40% or more of the private sector workforce. In most 
industries, those terms became standards for all workers, 
regardless of whether they were represented by a union. 
In the ensuing four decades, the number of private sector 
workers whose terms of employment are collectively negotiated has 
shrunk to just over 11% — a smaller percentage than when Congress 
declared it to be the national policy to encourage collective 
bargaining. The force that collective bargaining agreements exert 
on national labor standards has diminished proportionately. 
The consequence of this erosion is seen in what the 
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Commission's Fact Finding Report labels "changing labor market 
outcomes" — outcomes which, as the Commission says, are 
inconsistent "with our past economic history of progress for 
virtually all our citizens" and that "fall short of meeting the 
needs of many Americans." The United States is becoming a two-
tiered society with, to quote the Commission again, "an upper tier 
of high wage, skilled workers and an increasing 'underclass' of low 
paid labor." Our "earnings distribution ... is the most unequal 
among developed countries." And, the ability of younger workers 
"to form families and buy homes has been compromised by their labor 
market plight." 
The consequences of a diminished collective bargaining system 
are seen, too, in what the Commission terms "an explosion in the 
breadth and depth of legal regulation of the American workplace" 
and a "dramatic surge in employment law disputes." Collective 
bargaining, and the grievance-arbitration procedure established 
through bargaining, provide a means to resolve workplace issues 
without resort to government regulation or to court litigation. To 
the extent working men and women are no longer able to protect 
themselves in this way, they inevitably demand, and they have 
secured, more and more in the way of government-mandated labor 
standards enforced through court litigation. 
As the Commission warns, "a healthy society cannot long 
continue along the path the U.S. is moving." 
The challenge facing this Commission — and this country — 
then, is, to breathe new life into the policy of the NLRA: to once 
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again encourage the practice of collective bargaining so that the 
collective bargaining system can again serve as a private means of 
advancing the national interest in establishing and enforcing labor 
standards in this country. No society at any time and in any place 
has ever succeeded in achieving widely-shared prosperity without an 
effective means of safeguarding the interests of working families. 
And no society has ever succeeded in establishing a stable 
political democracy without the nourishment provided by a vital 
labor movement. 
If we fail to revitalize our collective bargaining system, we 
therefore face a future of continuing degradation of our standard 
of living and continuing polarization of our society. Without a 
vibrant system of worker representation, inevitably some future 
Commission will be called upon to devise a whole new means through 
which the government can establish and enforce the kind of labor 
standards that the national interest demands. 
What, then, should be done to the "present legal framework" 
governing the collective bargaining system to enable that system to 
fulfill its mission? 
The short answer is: a great deal. Mere tinkering with the 
NLRA's rules, procedures and remedies will not suffice. Experience 
shows that these rules and remedies no longer "encourage collective 
bargaining" and no longer "protect the exercise by workers of full 
freedom of association." Nothing less than a fundamental reworking 
of the NLRA will make representation accessible to all workers and 
nothing less will enable employees to participate on an equal basis 
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through collective bargaining in the decisions which critically 
affect their working lives. The task of this Commission, as we see 
it, is to detail the full agenda that is required to meet the needs 
of working men and women — and of the nation. 
During the past year, since the announcement of the creation 
of this Commission, the AFL-CIO, through its Committee on the 
Evolution of Work, has engaged its affiliates in formulating 
recommendations for reforms of the NLRA and related laws in order 
to achieve these ends; the Industrial Union Department of the 
AFL-CIO began a similar process even earlier. We are today 
submitting to the Commission a complete proposal for change which 
reflects the results of this extensive work. We also are 
submitting the IUD's comprehensive white paper, Workplace Rights, 
which elaborates on the need for reform and on many of the reforms 
that are needed. Together, these documents represent the best 
thinking of the labor movement on the question at hand. 
Our recommendations, it should be emphasized, address both the 
rules governing access to representation and the rules governing 
the collective bargaining process. That dual focus reflects our 
understanding of the breadth of this Commission's mission and of 
the scope of the needed changes. As AFL-CIO President Lane 
Kirkland stated in his testimony to the Commission, the current law 
is an "abject failure" in its treatment of both freedom of 
association and of collective bargaining. 
Both aspects of the law must be reformed if the NLRA is to 
deliver on its promise. It will not do to address only the 
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deficiencies in the representation process. Even the most perfect 
protection of the right to organize from coercive employer 
interference would be of little practical consequence so long as 
the organizations that workers have the right to form can engage 
only in what President Kirkland aptly termed "collective begging." 
Rather, what is required is a comprehensive overhaul of the NLRA in 
all its aspects. That is what the proposals we are submitting seek 
to accomplish. 
There is not time today to review with this Commission each 
item which is included in our proposal. And, given the attention 
this Commission has devoted to the problems of the representation 
process, I wish to concentrate the balance of my remarks on our 
recommendations in that area as well. 
If the principal failure of the NLRA's representation system 
lay in the large number of employers who flout the law, the task 
facing the Commission would be rather straight-forward. There is 
no mystery as to why so many employers violate the Act with such 
frequency: under this law, crime pays. 
As authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court, the NLRA — 
unlike virtually every other contemporary employment law — permits 
only "make whole" remedies rather than remedies designed to deter 
unlawful conduct. For unlawful discharges this means that the 
ordinary remedy, at least in theory, is reinstatement with back 
pay. But in practice, reinstatement can be secured only through 
protracted litigation by which time the employee will have found a 
new job. Thus, as the Commission observes, "most illegally fired 
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workers do not take advantage of the right to reinstatement." As 
a result, the only penalty is a back pay award which, on average, 
amounts to only $2,479 per discharge. And, for employer conduct 
which otherwise interferes with, restrains, or coerces the exercise 
of the right to organize — conduct such as illegal threats to, or 
illegal surveillance of, union supporters — the remedies are 
weaker still: the NLRB ordinarily does nothing more than order the 
offending employer to post a notice foreswearing future illegal 
conduct. 
The Labor Board, in our view, could do more within the 
confines of current law to strengthen its remedies if the Board 
were to focus its remedial authority on the affirmative steps 
required to undo the effects on the employee group of illegal 
conduct. But the basic problem here lies in the statute itself 
which leaves no room for remedies with a sufficient bite to deter 
employers from committing unfair labor practices in the first 
place. 
Nor is there any mystery as to the type of statutory change 
needed to prevent employers from freely taking the law into their 
own hands: the NLRA should be brought in line with more recent 
employment laws by including sanctions to deter illegal conduct 
along with expeditious procedures to assure prompt relief. 
Stronger legal penalties are required for illegal discharges — 
where the victim is both an individual, identifiable victim and the 
employee group's right to organize — and are also required for 
other illegal acts in which the "only victim" is the employee group 
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as a whole. While in the short term such measures might, as some 
have argued, increase the number of charges that are filed and 
reduce the number that are settled, in the long term stiff er 
penalties will reduce the volume of litigation by deterring the 
unlawful conduct that gives rise to such litigation. 
Similarly, if the problem of the Act's representation system 
lay in the length of time it takes to hold representation 
elections, the path to reform would be short and well marked. By 
more carefully managing the pre-election process, the NLRB could 
itself reduce the length of time it takes to schedule elections and 
most especially reduce the inordinate delay that can result when an 
employer refuses to stipulate to an election,1 and that is a 
particular problem in elections involving larger bargaining units.2 
Fred Feinstein, the current General Counsel of the NLRB has 
announced that this will be a priority for his administration. 
1We have analyzed data supplied to the AFL-CIO by the NLRB, 
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, concerning all 
representation elections held from 1984-1992. Our analysis 
indicates that 85% of all stipulated elections — but only 17% of 
elections in which the employer refuses to stipulate — are 
completed within 60 days of the election petition. At the other 
end of the spectrum, only 2% of stipulated elections — but 20% of 
non-stipulate elections — take more than 120 days to conduct. 
Because of how long it can take to hold a non-stipulated 
election, employers have undue leverage in negotiations over the 
date of the election, the composition of the bargaining unit, and 
the other issues that go into a stipulated election. 
2
 The NLRB data for 1984-92 indicates that in units of less 
than 50 employees, 77.5% of the elections are concluded within 
sixty days and only 6.4% take over 90 days. In units of more than 
250 employees, only 52.3% are concluded within sixty days whereas 
17.8% take over 90 days. This undoubtedly is partially explained 
by the fact that employers refuse to stipulate to elections in 
25.5% of the larger units but only 15.9% of the smaller units. 
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The General Counsel and the Board are handicapped in this 
regard, however, by the statutory provision requiring a pre-
election hearing in all cases. Amending the statute to eliminate 
this requirement where the Board believes there are no factual 
questions requiring a pre-election hearing and to establish 
absolute deadlines for holding elections is merely to follow 
established common sense. In four of the Canadian provinces 
(including Ontario and British Columbia) a union is entitled to a 
pre-hearing election if the union demonstrates a certain level of 
support, and in a fifth province (Nova Scotia) there is a five-day 
statutory deadline for holding representation elections where the 
union's petition is supported by at least 40% of the proposed 
bargaining unit.3 
We do not dwell upon these matters, however, because in our 
view the issues of inadequate remedies and of undue election delay 
are merely the most transparent — and in many ways the least 
profound — problems with the NLRA representation system as it 
operates today. While these issues must be addressed, doing so — 
providing tougher remedies and speedier processes — would not in 
and of itself afford workers an effective right to representation. 
If the Commission's recommendations are to make a real difference -
- if they are to secure for workers an effective right to organize 
— the Commission's recommendations must go further and deal with 
the more fundamental defects in the representation system. 
3G. Adams, Canadian Labour Law at pp. 7-52, 7-70 & n.418 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
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One of these defects is the extraordinarily one-sided nature 
of the rules which govern the election campaign. Organizing 
campaigns do not take place in a vacuum/ rather, they occur against 
a background in which an employer of any size will have carefully 
screened its employees to "weed out" those with a propensity to 
organize and will have instituted a sophisticated and systematic 
program of union avoidance. Such programs begin the day an 
employee is hired with an orientation session and new employee 
manual stressing the employer's commitment to preserving its union-
free environment, and such programs continue throughout the 
employee's tenure with the company with the stated aim of detecting 
the "first signs" of organizing activity and responding in ways 
that will stamp out that activity. 
In this context, the only way employees can overcome the 
employer's resistance is with union assistance. But under the 
current law, employers are free to exclude union organizers from 
the workplace, including non-working areas. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has held that organizers even may be denied entry to property 
which is open to all other members of the public such as a public 
parking lot or a cafeteria. And employers can do this while at' 
the same time using the workplace for posters, leaflets and other 
written (and electronic) anti-union messages; requiring employees 
to attend "captive audience" meetings, often daily, to hear the 
employer's anti-union speeches; and directing supervisors to "work 
on" (or work over) union sympathizers throughout the work day. 
This puts the union organizer -- and hence the organizing 
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effort — at an extraordinary disadvantage. The workplace, after 
all, is the one place in which those called upon to decide whether 
they desire representation come together as a group; when they 
leave work, employees typically disperse throughout large 
metropolitan or even larger rural areas. The exclusion of the 
organizer from the workplace both frustrates face-to-face 
communication with the organizer and turns organizing into a 
subterranean activity. That sends a powerful message to the 
employees about the extent to which the law subordinates employee 
rights to employer prerogatives. 
As Richard Bensinger, Executive Director of the AFL-CIO 
Organizing institute, suggested to the Commission at its last 
hearing, these rules are analogous to giving one candidate in a 
political election unlimited amounts of free television time, 
including several hours a day of compulsory viewing, while 
restricting the other candidate to door-to-door campaigning. 
The law ought to encourage the widest possible dissemination 
to employees of information about their rights and about the option 
of representation. Instead, the law allows such information to be 
drowned out by the employer. 
Once again, there is no doubt as to what changes are needed to 
redress this situation. Union organizers should be permitted 
complete access to public and other non-working areas within the 
workplace to meet with employees during non-working time. And, 
union organizers also should be given a reasonable opportunity to 
attend employee meetings to address the employee group. 
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Providing stronger penalties for unfair labor practices, 
swifter election procedures, and fairer access for union organizers 
would represent the most rudimentary beginning in righting the 
current system's wrongs. But these three steps — separately or 
together — still fall short of addressing the essence of the 
problem with the representation system. The Commission in its Fact 
Finding Report identified the disease eating at the heart of the 
right of free association: it is what the Commission termed the 
"highly confrontational" representation process which the NLRA, 
almost inadvertently, has institutionalized. 
In the Commission's words, under the NLRA's representation 
system "the issue of union representation sparks a highly 
contested" and "highly conflictual" campaign "that produces 
considerable tension at the workplace" and that leads to "an 
environment of bitter, prolonged and inflammatory debate over the 
process of worker representation." The United States "is the only 
major democratic country in which the choice of whether or not 
workers are to be represented by a union is subject to such a 
confrontational process in most cases." This process — in the 
name of enhancing employee free choice — in fact undermines 
democratic employee decision making in two distinct ways. 
First and most obviously, workers contemplating union 
representation and collective bargaining find themselves, as the 
Commission put it, "[c]aught in the midst of these conflicts"; they 
"want a voice on their job but fear the tensions, risks and 
adversarial climate that sometimes" — we would say, virtually 
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always — "accompany efforts to exercise those rights." Allison 
Porter, the Director of Recruitment and Training for the AFL-CIO 
Organizing Institute, elaborated on this point in words the 
Commission quoted in its report and that bear quoting again: 
In my experience, fear is the number one obstacle to why 
workers won't support unions in the first place, and why ... 
even [if] they support a union, [they] won't want to get 
involved in an organizing drive. 
It starts out as fear of retaliation. What's going to happen 
to me if I do this? Then it becomes a more generalized fear 
of what's gong to happen to all of us. What will we lose that 
we already have? Then it becomes fear of the union as it's 
being described by management, the outsider, third party 
aspects. Then it becomes fear of strikes, being forced to 
strike and plant closing. Then finally, towards the end of 
the campaign, it just becomes fear of change — the devil we 
know versus the devil we don't. That's the essence of the 
employer campaign. 
Indeed, as Ms. Porter testified, while in theory all workers 
covered by the NLRA have the right to organize, in practice the 
only workers who have that right today — who can overcome serious 
employer opposition to organizing — are those who are so 
alienated, so angry or so courageous that they no longer care, or 
are capable of disregarding, what happens to them and to their job. 
As one of Ms. Porter's young organizers put it in a report she 
quoted, "if they care, they're vulnerable." 
Second, and of equal importance, because of the kind of anti-
union campaigns employers wage, organizing, as President Kirkland 
pointed out to this Commission, has "become inordinately expensive 
— beyond the means of workers at an individual workplace and 
taxing on the resources available to the already-organized." Given 
limited resources, our unions find it necessary to be highly 
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selective in the campaigns in which we get involved. Workers in 
many workplaces who seek our help must be told that, given the 
current legal rules, they are "not ready" to organize. The net 
effect is to make representation inaccessible to most American 
workers; indeed, as President Kirkland noted, "in any given year 
just two-tenths of one percent of unorganized workers have the 
opportunity even to vote as to whether they wish union 
representation." 
It follows that what is called for, if workers are to have a 
real, rather than a paper, right to organize are measures to make 
representation accessible to ordinary workers — workers of 
ordinary courage, who are not heroes, and who have ordinary 
concerns about their jobs, their working conditions, and their 
economic future. The process of deciding whether to select a union 
representative must be made less confrontational, less threatening 
and less costly. 
That, we recognize, is a daunting task. As Professor Matthew 
Finkin stated in his testimony to this Commission, the challenge is 
to "patch together an effective system of representation where an 
employer simply doesn't want to deal with that system at all" — 
where there are "no shared values between the employer and .. the 
employees." It is, as Professor Finkin went on to testify, 
difficult to be "sanguine about being able to put Humpty Dumpty 
back together under those circumstances, but surely something more 
needs to be done." 
Our recommendations to the Commission outline all of the steps 
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that we believe should be taken towards this end. These proposals 
form a coherent whole. But allow me to highlight two reforms of 
especial importance: our proposal for first contract interest 
arbitration and our proposal for a system of recognition based upon 
authorization or membership cards. 
1. The principal reason that anti-union employers find it a 
simple matter to run fear campaigns is that the current law gives 
them much raw material to work from. Section 8(a) of the Act was 
passed because Congress and the country at large recognized that 
permitting employers to use their superior economic power against 
employees who seek to form a union would, as a practical matter, 
nullify the right to organize and, as a moral matter, is 
indefensible. But the prohibitions of employer discrimination and 
of employer interference, restraint, and coercion have proven 
empty. 
Because the law allows employers wide latitude — through 
"hard bargaining," lockouts, forced strikes, and through 
"economically-motivated" business decisions — to settle scores 
with employees who choose a union, it is easy enough for employers, 
during the organizing campaign, to sow the seeds of fear. The 
employer cannot, of course, tell the employees that it will respond 
to organization by retaliating against the employee group; that 
would be a § 8(a)(1) "threat" and would be illegal. But the 
employer is perfectly free to "report" about what "could" happen to 
the employees if they organize or about what other employers have 
done when their employees formed a union. Lawyers may be beguiled 
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by such distinctions but working people see through them; as 
President Kirkland put it, workers "know who the employer is, what 
his powers are, and what he is saying." 
The NLRB could, and in our view should, recognize these 
campaign tactics for what they are and what they are understood to 
be by the employees: veiled threats of employer retaliation which 
— no less than overt threats — interfere with, restrain and 
coerce the exercise of the right to organize. But in the end the 
aim of the law should not be to insulate employees from knowledge 
of the risks of employer retaliation against those who form a union 
but rather to eliminate those risks. Unless and until the 
substantive rules which allow employers to put employees who choose 
v. 
to organize at such peril and which guarantee employees so little 
are fundamentally changed, employer anti-union campaigns will 
continue to be permeated by the threat of employer economic 
retaliation covered over with the cosmetics of employer free 
speech. 
A proven starting point for taking the sting out of such 
campaigning is to guarantee workers contemplating union 
representation that if they choose to organize they will be assured 
a fair, first collective bargaining agreement and will not be 
forced to put their jobs on the line to secure that agreement. The 
prospect of negotiating a first labor contract is daunting for many 
workers, at least after the employer finishes propagandizing about 
"bargaining from scratch," take-backs, strikes, replacements, plant 
closing and the like. That fear could be dispelled — and the 
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process of negotiating an initial agreement facilitated — by 
following what is now the predominant Canadian rule, i.e., by 
assuring workers that, if they organize and after a specified 
period of time are unable to come to an initial collective 
bargaining agreement on their own or with the help of a mediator, 
a neutral arbitrator will resolve all unresolved items and 
establish a fair and reasonable first contract for the parties.4 
The Canadian experience belies the concerns that have been 
expressed by some about the consequences of authorizing interest 
arbitration in "first contract" disputes. The AFL-CIO has secured 
from the provinces which provide for first contract interest 
arbitration, and from the national government, data on the 
frequency with which first contracts are imposed under these 
Canadian laws. That data, which is appended to this statement, 
proves that rarely is first contract interest arbitration sought 
and even more rarely is a contract imposed; in 1993, for example, 
there were a total of 23 imposed contracts arising out of the 1,233 
certifications issued that year. 
Nor is this in any way surprising. The reason that 40% of 
first contract negotiations in the United States fail today is that 
"no contract" is the employers' desired outcome; the employer wants 
the negotiations to fail so as to be able to reinstitute its 
unilateral control over the workplace and to defeat the workers• 
choice of a representative. If that were no longer a possible 
outcome — if a first contract were guaranteed through arbitration 
4See G. Adams, supra. pp. 10-134 to 10-140. 
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if need be — it is to be expected that in most cases the parties 
would view a private resolution as preferable to the "wildcard" of 
an arbitral decision and that the bargaining process — with the 
aid of mediation where appropriate — would produce an agreement in 
the overwhelming majority of cases. That is precisely what has 
happened in Canada. 
Lest there be any doubt, I want to make it crystal clear that 
we are not advocating interest arbitration merely as a remedy for 
bad faith bargaining. Most of the Canadian provinces which at one 
time provided for such limited first contract interest arbitration 
have moved to a system in which arbitration is at least available 
as the dispute resolution mechanism of last resort in first 
contract cases — and with good reason. 
So long as an employer goes through the motions of meeting 
with the union at reasonable times and places, it is virtually 
impossible for an administrative agency removed from the bargaining 
process to distinguish "bad faith" bargaining from "hard 
bargaining." This is especially true given the rule that good 
faith bargaining does not "compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession." Thus, an interest 
arbitration law which applied only to bad faith bargaining 
situations would be likely to have little practical effect other 
than to push employers towards going through the motions of 
bargaining. 
Moreover, the ultimate point of our proposal is to strip out 
of the representation process the inordinate fear of employer 
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economic retaliation against employee organization. Assuring 
employees who are contemplating choosing a representative of a 
first contract, through arbitration if need be, goes a long way 
towards that end. In contrast, such a "guarantee" limited to cases 
in which the employer eventually is found guilty of bad faith 
bargaining is too uncertain to be of practical consequence. 
Thus, if, as we urge, the ultimate aim is to make 
representation accessible to ordinary workers, first contract 
interest arbitration must be made available as a last resort means 
of dispute resolution in all cases. 
2. A second major step towards creating an effective right to 
organize would be to alter — or at least to create alternatives to 
— the present process through which the fact that workers have 
chosen a representative is certified by the government. 
The NLRA's premise is that union organization is entirely 
compatible with every legitimate employer prerogative and with 
sound and efficient production. The collective bargaining system 
is a means of improving employer-employee relations not of 
destroying those relations or the employer. Organization, then, is 
not and has never been seen by the law as a zero sum game. 
But elections are structured as zero sum games. They are a 
method of choosing one of the two contestants who run against each 
other and of rejecting the second. Following that inherent 
characteristic, representation elections inevitably transform what 
should be a decision by employees as to whether or not they desire 
representation into contests between unions and employers as to 
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which side will defeat the other. It is this artificial, contest 
structure and win-lose mentality that so intensifies the 
adversarial nature of the representation process. 
Clifford Ehrlich, the Senior Vice President for Human 
Resources of Marriott Corporation and a member of the Board of 
Directors of the Labor Policy Association, made this point clearly 
in his testimony before the Commission. Asked by Tom Kochan "what 
should we do to de-escalate the amount of resources going into this 
kind of activity" and **[h]ow do we de-escalate the ideological 
warfare," Ehrlich responded, in part, as follows: 
I don't have a good response to that. . .. When you talk about 
elections you're talking about winning and losing, and in a 
competitive society, I think you're going to be applying 
resources to [winning]. No one likes to turn1 out to be the 
loser in that situation. 
Indeed, as Martin Jay Levitt demonstrates in his book 
Confessions of A Union Buster, the anti-union consultants build 
their campaigns on precisely this drive for victory. One of the 
key jobs of the consultant is to persuade first-line supervisors 
that a vote for a union is a vote against supervision; describing 
his strategy in a campaign he ran to prevent a group of mineworkers 
from organizing, Levitt writes: 
We'll convince the foremen that when the National labor 
Relations Board holds the representation election, the workers 
will not be voting for or against the union, but for or 
against the management, including all of them. To lose the 
election would be a humiliation, an indictment of their 
management abilities. Once they see it my way, the foreman 
will gladly join the war on the [Mineworkers]. 
In his testimony Ehrlich went on to suggest that if the 
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Commission wants to de-escalate the warfare, "you've got to go back 
and take a look at how it got escalated in the first place." We 
agree. And, because, as Ehrlich's testimony shows, the electoral 
process is itself one of the roots of the problem, we propose that 
workers be allowed to decide whether they desire representation 
without requiring a tortuous electoral contest. 
Our proposal, it should be emphasized, does not represent some 
radical departure from the principle of employee free choice. In 
virtually every other industrialized country, unions are 
established without elections or written authorizations. Moreover, 
in this country, many employees — including the employees of the 
companies with the very best labor-management relations — make 
their decision about representation through authorization cards. 
Such cards, if freely signed by a majority of the employees in an 
appropriate unit, are a legally sufficient means of establishing 
the employees' desire for representation. An employer who 
determines to accept a proper card showing and to voluntarily 
recognize a union so designed by a majority acts in full conformity 
with the law. Indeed, such a voluntary recognition is as legally 
enforceable as an NLRB certification following a Board election. 
The problem with the current law is that the NLRB — with 
Supreme Court approval — has interpreted the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
Amendments to mean that the decision whether to give authorization 
cards this effect is a decision that is left entirely to the 
employer as a matter of its unbounded discretion. No matter what 
the facts, employers are entirely free to disregard the employees' 
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expressed desire for a representative and to insist upon an NLRB-
conducted representation election. 
This regime transforms the function of an NLRB election from 
what was originally intended. Section 9's election machinery was 
established to address situations where a demand for recognition 
creates a genuine uncertainty as to whether, or by whom, the 
employees wish to be represented and where a neutral governmental 
resolution of that uncertainty is a sensible response to the 
employer's demand for reasonable certainty. Representation 
proceedings, in other words, were to be investigations into a 
question of fact: have a majority of an employee group, as it is 
claimed, designated a particular union as their representative. 
Now, however, employers can and do trigger NLRB elections 
where there is not a shadow of a doubt as to the employees' desire 
when they request recognition of their chosen representative; 
indeed, this Commission has heard of cases in which the entire unit 
went to the employer as a group to request recognition of their 
representative and the employer stood on his right to an NLRB 
election. In these cases, a representation election is not needed 
to clear away the obstacle to collective bargaining posed by a 
genuine uncertainty as to the employees' desires. Rather, the only 
point of an election is to afford the employer an opportunity to 
change the employees' desires. There is no reason for the law to 
indulge this employer desire. 
We recognize the argument that without an election there will 
be no opportunity for employees to hear the employers' perspective 
24 
on organizing. It is far from clear that this is, in fact, true: as 
I already have noted, union avoidance begins the very day an 
employee is hired and continues throughout the employee's tenure. 
Moreover, in the ordinary course most employers learn of efforts by 
their employees to form a union at the very inception of the 
organizing effort and commence the anti-union campaign at that 
point. The election process merely allows the employer to extend 
the time for campaigning beyond the point at which the employees 
have manifested their desire for representation and to force the 
employees to prove that they have, indeed, selected a union by 
coming to the workplace and casting a vote "against" their 
employer. 
More fundamentally, the employee decision as to whether to 
have a bargaining representative is just that — a decision for the 
employees to make. Employees are fully competent to make that 
decision on their own, just as employees make a host of other 
decisions of far greater moment in their lives without the 
intervention, or the assistance, of their employer. 
The proposition that employees do not have sufficient facts to 
act on their own gravely underestimates the state of employee 
knowledge and is directly refuted by every relevant opinion poll of 
which we are aware. The proposition that employees will sign 
authorization cards frivolously or out of fear has no basis in 
reason or experience. And the proposition that employers who run 
anti-union campaigns act from a disinterested desire to facilitate 
informed and reasoned employee free choice and therefore perform a 
25 
public service is a fantasy. 
Indeed, no one can seriously doubt that the employer's intervention 
in the employees' representation decisions is animated by the 
employer's perceived self-interest and that the employer's campaign 
takes its inordinate force not from the employer's persuasive power 
but from its economic power — that is, from the employer's ability 
to retaliate against the employees if they make the "wrong" free 
choice. 
It is also very much to the point to note that no 
certification is forever. If authorization or membership cards 
cease to reflect employee desires, the employees will have ample 
opportunity to correct the error within a relatively short period 
of time. 
The short of the matter is, then, that the benefits of the 
current election system in advancing free and informed employee 
choice are marginal at best. Any such benefits are outweighed by 
the certainty that the representation election system exacerbates 
the very evils the Commission has identified. 
For that reason, the NLRA should take from employers the final 
authority to reject written expressions of employees' desire for 
representation and should permit the NLRB to certify a union where 
the evidence presented demonstrates that a majority of the 
appropriate employee group, through such designations, has 
unequivocally authorized the union to serve as their 
representative. Permitting the NLRB to certify a representative 
based upon signed authorization or membership cards would restore 
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to the Board a power that it enjoyed for the first twelve years 
after the law was enacted and would give our Labor Board the same 
power that most of the Canadian labor boards exercise.6 
First contract arbitration and card check recognition would be 
major steps forward in reducing the fear, and the heat, that today 
envelops the representation process. But neither these measures 
nor the others I have discussed today are panaceas. And I want to 
emphasize again that the proposals I have discussed are by no means 
the limit of the changes that need to be made if the NLRA is to 
deliver on its promises to working men and women. 
The AFL-CIO stands ready to assist the Commission in any way 
we can in the coming months. We look forward to a final report in 
November clearly defining for the nation the full set of changes 
required in the "legal framework of collective bargaining" if the 
collective bargaining system is to be able to fulfill its mission 
once again. 
6G. Adams, supra, at 7-68. 
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CONCERNING 
CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND 
RELATED LAWS 
September 8, 1994 
The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 
has been asked by the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce to submit 
recommendations as to the "changes [that] should be made in the 
present legal framework and practices of collective bargaining ..." 
To assist the Commission in formulating its recommendations, the 
AFL-CIO, through its Committee on the Evolution of Work, has 
engaged the unions and departments affiliated with the AFL-CIO in 
formulating this proposal which seeks to identify the changes that, 
in the labor movement's view, must be made in the labor laws if the 
National Labor Relations Act is to become, once again, the Magna 
Carta for American working men and women. 
The AFL-CIO also is submitting to the Commission Workplace 
Rights, a white paper prepared by the Industrial Union Department 
of the AFL-CIO which elaborates on many of the recommendations 
contained herein and which includes a number of additional 
proposals as well. 
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I. Coverage 
The National Labor Relations Act extends rights to persons who 
fall within the statutory definition of the term "employee" in § 
2(3) and who are employed by an entity falling within the statutory 
definition of the term "employer" in § 2(2). Both of those terms 
are defined or have been interpreted to deny millions of working 
men and women of the right to organize; indeed one recent estimate 
finds that upwards of 25% of all working women fall outside the 
Act's coverage.1 
The largest single NLRA exclusion — that of public employers 
— is not within this Commission's jurisdiction to address. But 
this Commission does have authority to recommend measures to 
rectify many of the other statutory restrictions on the Act's 
coverage. Specifically: 
1. Agricultural and Domestic Workers — The term "employee" 
in the Act is defined to exclude "any individual employed as an 
agricultural laborer or in the domestic services of any family or 
person at his home." These exclusions reflect little more than a 
plantation mentality and should be eliminated. 
2. Supervisors — The Act likewise excludes "supervisors" 
from the definition of "employee." As we previously have argued to 
this Commission, the supervisory exclusion is both over and under 
inclusive and, as in Canada, should be replaced by a narrowly-
defined provision excluding "managers" from the Act, or, as in 
1Cobble, Making Postindustrial Unionism Possible, in S. 
Friedman, R. Hurd, R. Oswald & R. Seeber (eds), Restoring the 
Promise of American Labor Law (1994). 
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Sweeden, replaced by a provision excluding managers from bargaining 
units of non-managers while allowing them to organize into their 
own units. In either event, such a managerial provision should not 
encompass employees who exercise so-called managerial authority on 
a collective or collegial basis. 
3. Independent Contractors — The 1947 Taft-Hartley 
Amendment to the NLRA expressly excluded "independent contractors." 
This exclusion should be repealed. Doing so would not necessarily 
extend the Act's coverage to self-employed individuals since the 
Act even without the independent contractor provision still would 
extend protection only to "employees." But repealing the 
independent contractor exclusion would give the NLRB the authority 
— which it had and exercised prior to 19472 — to define the term 
"employee" in a way that reflects the policies of the labor law 
rather than forcing the NLRB to use the outdated, common-law line 
separating employees from independent contractors. In addition, as 
we have previously urged, "dependent contractors" should be 
specifically included within the definition of employee. 
4. "Guards" — Although individuals denominated as "guards" 
technically are "employees" under the Act, under the 1947 
Amendments guards cannot be represented by a union which also 
represents employees other than guards, even if the guards and non-
guards are in separate units and separate locals. As a practical 
matter this limitation severely restricts the right of guards to 
2See. e.g.. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications. Inc. 322 U.S. 
Ill (1944) (Upholding the NLRB's decision's treating "newsboys" as 
employees without regard to their common law status). 
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workplace representation. To make matters worse, the NLRB has 
interpreted the term "guard" to include not only individuals who 
are responsible for enforcing discipline vis a vis other employees 
(and as to whom there may be concerns of divided loyalty) but also 
other security personnel, such as armored truck drivers, night 
watchmen and the like, who guard property from harm by outsiders.3 
The guard provision should be amended to require only that guards 
be in separate units and local unions from non-guards and the term 
"guard" should be interpreted or amended to apply only to those 
employees whose primary responsibility is to prevent misconduct by 
employees of their employer. 
5. Government Contractors — The NLRB has , treated private 
entities which are funded through government contracts or grants as 
excluded "public employers" if the government is deemed to exercise 
"sufficient control" over labor relations through the contracting 
process.4 The result is that the employees of these entities find 
themselves in a no-man's land: they are not public employees and 
generally are not covered by state public sector collective 
bargaining laws yet they are excluded from the NLRA's coverage as 
if they were public employees. This makes no sense and creates 
incentives to privatize public services in order to exploit this 
loophole. The NLRA should be interpreted or amended so as to 
eliminate this no-man's land. 
3E.a.. Brinks. Inc. 226 NLRB 1182 (1976); A.W. Schlesinger 
Geriatric Center. 267 NLRB 1363 (1983). 
*Res Care. 280 NLRB 670 (1986) 
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6. Race TracX Employees — The NLRB has held that race tracks 
are not in and do not affect interstate commerce, and that 
therefore the NLRA does not apply to those employers. This rule is 
inconsistent with the modern understanding of commerce and should 
be administratively or legislatively overturned. 
6. Joint Employers — The NLRA does not contain a definition 
of the term MemployM and the NLRB has developed a constricted 
concept of employment. The Fair Labor Standards Act, in contrast, 
defines "employ" as "to suffer or permit to work," 29 U.S.C. § 
203(g), and that definition is incorporated in other employment 
legislation, such as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(5). This definition provides the 
basis for a more expansive conception of joint or co-employment and 
should be incorporated into the NLRA along with a more specific 
definition of "joint employer" as previously proposed to the 
Commission. 
II. The Representation Process 
The right of working men and women to associate freely in 
labor organizations which are independent of their employer is 
essential in a democratic society. Such organizations enable 
workers to participate effectively in decisions in the workplace 
and in the broader society. And through such organizations, 
working men and women are able to exercise their collective 
strength to improve their situation. 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states that 
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join 
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or assist labor organizations..." But the NLRA's rules and 
procedures surrounding the representation process make a mockery of 
that right. The following changes are needed in the representation 
process if working men and women are to enjoy full freedom of 
association. 
1. Certification Based Upon Authorization or Membership Cards 
— NLRA § 9(a) provides that a union shall be the employee's 
bargaining representative if it is "designated or selected by the 
majority of the employees" in a bargaining unit. But the 1947 
Amendments to the Act have been interpreted to mean that the NLRB 
must conduct a representation election where the employer insists 
on an election, and that other forms of employee support for 
representation — such as signed membership cards or unambiguous 
cards authorizing the union to serve as their representative — are 
determinative only if the employer chooses to treat them as such.5 
So interpreted, the Act pushes the representation process into a 
prolonged contest between the employer and the union. 
The NLRA should be amended to authorize the NLRB to certify a 
labor organization as the employees* exclusive representative if a 
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit have joined the 
organization or have signed unambiguous authorization cards 
designating the union to be their representative. 
In addition, NLRA § 8(b)(7) should be amended to permit 
picketing to secure recognition of a bargaining representative 
where a majority of the employees have signed authorization cards 
5Linden Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). 
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and the employer nonetheless has refused recognition. (Under 
current law such picketing is unlawful after 30 days unless the 
union petitions for a representation election.) 
2. Eliminating Delays and Bias in the Conduct of 
Representation Elections — Since 1947, NLRA § 9(c) has required 
the Board, before conducting a representation election, to conduct 
"an appropriate hearing upon due notice" unless the employer agrees 
to stipulate to the terms of an election. This gives employers 
inordinate leverage in negotiating the terms of stipulations 
because of the prolonged delay that can result from a 
representation hearing. 
The NLRA should be amended (i) to authorize the NLRB to 
conduct elections before resolving all "questions concerning 
representation" and (ii) to require that such elections be held 
promptly after the filing of the petition. The California 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act provides a model, as it requires 
that representation elections be held within five days. 
The NLRB also should use its rulemaking authority to resolve 
recurring unit issues and thereby shorten representation hearings. 
In addition, the Act should provide for voting to take place 
off the employer's premises so as to insulate employees from the 
intimidating effect of voting at the workplace for a representative 
opposed by the employer. 
3. Facilitate Union Access to Voters — Although the NLRA 
prohibits employers from interfering with employees in the exercise 
of their right to form unions, the Supreme Court has held that an 
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employer may prevent union organizers from entering even non-
working areas of the workplace during non-working hours to meet 
with employees contemplating organizing, and may do so even if the 
property is open to all other members of the public.6 The union 
thus must go door to door to meet the employees, and the NLRB does 
not require the employer to supply the union with a list of the 
names and addresses of the employees until after the election is 
scheduled.7 In contrast, the employer can and does propagandize 
the employees at the workplace from the moment the organizing 
effort begins. The end result is a one-sided process in which only 
the employer's voice is heard. Accordingly, 
(a) The NLRA should be amended to grant union organizers 
access to nonwork areas of the workplace (both outdoors and 
indoors) to meet with employees during nonworking time. 
(b) The NLRA should be amended to grant union organizers a 
fair opportunity to address employees on company property at 
specified times and to post material on employee bulletin boards. 
(c) The NLRA should be interpreted or amended to grant unions 
the right to receive the names and addresses of employees at the 
outset of the organizing campaign. 
4. Reducing the Costly and Conflictual Nature of 
Representation Campaigns — As the Commission's Fact Finding Report 
observes, most employers seek to thwart their employees from 
exercising their right to organic* by waging a bitter, anti-union 
"Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB. U.S. (1992). 
7Excelsior Underwear. 156 NLRB 1236 (1966). 
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campaign. Those campaigns make organizing costly and highly 
conflictual and produce "an environment of bitter, prolonged and 
inflammatory debate" which disserves the interest of all parties. 
The following measures would contribute significantly to "turning 
down the heat" and provide for a less coerced, freer choice by 
employees: 
(a) Repeal NLRA § 8(c). The decision by workers as to 
whether to form a labor organization is one the workers should be 
free to make for themselves without employer involvement. Whatever 
right employers may have to wage an anti-union campaign under the 
First Amendment should not be augmented by any additional, 
statutory privilege. Section 8(c), which was added to the Act in 
1947, does just that and has provided the basis for NLRB decisions 
permitting employers to compel attendance of captive audience 
meetings while refusing to allow unions access to such meetings.5 
The section ought to be repealed. 
(b) Remove the federal subsidies that exist for anti-union 
campaigns. The Social Security Act provides that, under Medicare, 
"In determining reasonable costs, costs incurred for activities 
directly related to influencing employees respecting unionization 
may not be included." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(N). Similarly, 
funds appropriated for Head Start "shall not be used to assist, 
promote, or deter union organizing." 42 U.S.C. § 9839(e). But 
with these two exceptions, government contractors and grantees may 
8See Babcock & Wilcox Co. . 77 NLRB 577, 578 (1948); Livingston 
Shirt Co.. 107 NLRB 400 (1953). 
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charge expenses incurred in anti-union campaigns (including the 
cost of hiring consultants, preparing literature etc.) to the 
government. Moreover, all employers may deduct from their income 
such expenses as "ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in 
carrying out [the] business." The Tax Code and federal procurement 
laws should be amended to incorporate the principle embodied in the 
Medicare and Head Start statutes that expenses incurred in 
resisting organizing are not deductible expenses. 
(c) Require full disclosure of the identity, activities, and 
fees paid to consultants engaged in anti-union campaigns. Title II 
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was 
intended to require such disclosure, but that Title has been 
interpreted not to apply to "behind the scenes" activity by 
consultants, such as coaching supervisors or writing campaign 
literature and speeches. Title II should be amended to cover all 
such activity and to require disclosure to employees during an 
organizing campaign. 
(d) Require posting of notices informing employees of their 
rights under the Act. 
5. Create Stronger Penalties For Employers Who Violate the 
NLRA During the Representation Process — NLRA § 10(c) authorizes 
the NLRB, upon finding a violation of the Act, to order "such 
affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this 
Act." The Supreme Court has held that this provision permits only 
make-whole remedies, and not remedies designed to deter unlawful 
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conduct.9 Not surprisingly, the NLRB's remedies have proved 
insufficient to discourage employer unfair labor practices. The 
following changes are required in the Act: 
(a) Individuals who are discharged or otherwise discriminated 
against because of their union activity should be entitled to 
recover consequential damages and attorneys fees. In addition, 
such remedies as personal notice and plant access for union 
organizers should be available as a matter of course. (The NLRB 
may well have unexercised authority to grant these latter remedies 
under current law.) 
(b) Employers who willfully violate the Act should be subject 
to punitive damages or fines and should be precluded' from enjoying 
the benefit of government contracts or grants. Where backpay is 
also awarded (as in cases involving illegal discharges), the 
punitive damages or fine could be set at a multiple of the backpay 
award as in the Fair Labor Standards Act (which provides for double 
damages) or the anti-trust laws (which provide for treble damages) . 
For other types of violations, such as illegal threats, 
surveillance and the like, punitive damages or fines should be 
authorized along the lines provided in the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(a), (b). 
(c) Undocumented workers whose rights are violated should be 
entitled to the same remedies as all other workers. 
8Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board. 313 U.S. 177 (1941); 
Republic Steel Corp v. Labor Board. 311 U.S. 7 (1940). 
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(d) Where the employer's wrongdoing makes a fair 
determination of the employees' desire for representation 
impossible, the NLRB should be authorized to issue a bargaining 
order even where, because of the wrongdoing, the union never was 
able to achieve a card majority. 
(e) In extreme cases, the government should have the power to 
appoint a trustee ad litem to oversee the employer's labor 
relations until the unlawful conduct is remedied and safeguards 
established to avoid repetition. Also in appropriate cases the 
NLRB should be empowered to compel payment of potential damages 
into an escrow account pending the outcome of the litigation. 
6. Improve the NLRA's Enforcement Procedures — If an 
employer chooses to contest an unfair labor practice complaint, the 
median time for the NLRB to adjudicate the complaint is two 
years,10 and if the employer appeals the NLRB's determination, the 
case will be delayed for another year or more. This potential for 
delay gives employers extraordinary leverage to negotiate cheap and 
inadequate settlements. To remedy this, the following changes 
should be made in the Act: 
(a) The NLRB should be given sufficient resources to enable 
it to schedule hearings and render decisions promptly. Decisions 
of Administrative Law Judges should be final unless the NLRB 
elects, on a discretionary basis, to review them. Attorneys or 
other advocates who engage in frivolous appeals or otherwise delay 
NLRB adjudication should be subject to sanctions. 
101990 Annual Report of the NLRB, Table 23. 
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(b) If during the pendency of an organizing campaign a charge 
is filed alleging illegal employer conduct, the preliminary 
investigation of such a charge should be given the same priority as 
is currently given to secondary boycott charges under NLRA § 10(1). 
Where reasonable cause exists to believe such a violation has 
occurred, the regional office should be required to seek injunctive 
relief just as such injunction proceedings are now mandatory under 
§ 10(1). 
(c) Once the NLRB issues a final order in an unfair labor 
practice proceeding, the employer should be obligated to comply 
unless the employer appeals within a short, specified time frame 
and obtains a stay from an appellate court. (Under NLRA § 10(e), 
the employer can ignore the NLRB order with impunity and the NLRB 
must initiate an action to enforce the order; only after the order 
is reviewed and "enforced" by a court does the employer come under 
a legal obligation to comply.) 
7. Authorize Interest Arbitration to Resolve Impasses in the 
Negotiation of the Initial Collective Bargaining Agreement — All 
too often, employers use the process of negotiating a first 
contract not as a means of determining the agreed-upon terms of 
employment but as an occasion to refight the representation issue 
and prevent the employees from enjoying any agreement or any 
representation at all. This is possible because the current duty 
to bargain does not "compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession," NLRA § 8(d). And employers 
can exploit the potential for a protracted negotiating battle in 
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the organizing process to fuel a sense that organizing against 
employer opposition is a futile gesture. 
After a specified period of time for negotiations and 
mediation, the NLRB (or another federal agency such as the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service) should be authorized to appoint 
an arbitral panel to arbitrate any unresolved issues in the 
parties' negotiations. 
III. Alternative Forms of Representation 
Under current law, an employer is not obligated to deal with 
an employee representative unless the representative has been 
selected or designated by a majority of the employees in a unit 
deemed appropriate by the NLRB. But there are many workplaces in 
which the employees who desire representation constitute less than 
a majority. The law's all-or-nothing approach frustrates the 
desire of these workers to participate in decisions affecting their 
working lives. 
As we previously have suggested to the Commission, the NLRA 
should be amended to obligate employers to meet, confer and share 
information with a representative designated by a specified 
percentage (e.g. 10%) of the non-managerial employees within the 
workplace. 
To assure that such an organization can function effectively 
as a representative: (i) the elected employee leaders of the 
representative should be entitled to reasonable amounts of time off 
with pay to perform their representational functions; (ii) 
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officials of the representative should have access to non-working 
ares of the employer's premises to meet with employees during non-
work time; and (iii) the employer should be obligated to honor 
requests by employees to have dues withheld from their paycheck and 
remitted to the representative. Such rights, of course also would 
have to be extended by law to majority representatives lest the law 
discourage majority representation. 
If more than one representative is designated within a single 
workplace, the employer may insist upon joint consultations with 
the representatives. 
IV. The Collective Bargaining Process 
The ultimate purpose of creating a representation system is, 
of course, to enable employees and employers to resolve jointly 
issues affecting the employees' working lives. The likelihood of 
achieving that result is very much a function of the rules 
governing the collective bargaining process and especially the 
rules that determine the economic weapons available to each side in 
the event of a bargaining impasse. 
As presently written and construed, the NLRA artificially 
constricts the bargaining process, systematically tips the balance 
of power in the employers' favor, and grants employers wide leeway 
to evade agreements in force. The following legal changes are 
therefore required to redress the imbalance in power that the Act 
was passed — but has failed — to redress. 
1. Facilitating Bargaining Above the Level of the Individual 
Bargaining Unit — Under current law, once a grouping of employees 
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is determined to be appropriate for purposes of holding a 
representation election, that unit becomes the unit for bargaining 
as well. Bargaining thus must proceed on an employer-by-employer -
- and, indeed, on a unit-by-unit — basis unless the parties 
mutually agree otherwise. The employer is not even obligated to 
discuss the scope of the bargaining group with the union and the 
union cannot take actions to compel the employer to deal with 
employees on a multi-unit basis. Yet in many instances, collective 
bargaining can work only if it involves multiple facilities of an 
employer or multiple employers within an industry. The following 
steps should be taken to remove the single unit straight jacket: 
(a) Where multiple units of an employer in a pommon industry 
are organized, the union or unions representing the employees 
should have the right to compel combination of the units for 
purposes of bargaining. This also should hold true if the 
employer is a joint employer with another entity with respect to 
some units. 
(b) Where units of multiple employers in a common industry or 
in an integrated production process are organized, the NLRB should 
have the authority to combine the units for bargaining purposes. 
In addition, the union or unions representing the employees of 
those employers should be free to demand multi-employer bargaining 
and to engage in protected concerted activity to secure such 
bargaining. 
2. Mandatory subjects of Bargaining — NLRA § 8(d) defines 
the duty to bargain as an obligation to "confer in good faith with 
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respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment ..." The Supreme Court has held that this duty does not 
extend to at least some decisions involving the "scope and 
direction" of the enterprise even where such decisions vitally 
affect terms and conditions of employment.11 As a result employees 
have no right to participate in, e.g., decisions to shut down part 
of a business no matter how vitally the employees* interests are 
affected, and employers have no obligation to deal with employees 
on such issues. This rule negates the point of collective 
bargaining. 
The NLRA should be amended to mandate bargaining on all 
matters that significantly affect wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, including such issues as the scope of 
work to be performed by bargaining unit employees; work processes, 
work organization and the use of new technology; and product 
quality and safety. 
3. Information Sharing — The Supreme Court has held that the 
duty to bargain includes a duty to share financial information with 
the union where the employer claims a financial inability to pay 
wages or benefits proposed by the union.12 For almost forty years, 
the Supreme Court's decision has been understood by the lower 
courts and the NLRB to state the limit of the employer's obligation 
to share financial information with the union. As a result, 
"First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 452 U.S. 666 
(1981). 
12NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.. 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
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through artful negotiations employers are able to avoid any duty to 
disclose such information and can force the union to negotiate in 
the dark. This gives employers an unfair advantage and makes it 
impossible for the parties to carry on informed discussions or for 
unions to make informed judgments. 
The NLRA should be amended to grant unions the right as a 
matter of course to such financial and operational information as 
is relevant to the bargaining process. Such information should be 
provided at an early stage of the negotiations and in a useable 
format. 
4. Remedies for Breach of the Duty to Bargain — The 
limitations on the NLRB's remedial authority previously discussed 
have an especially severe impact when it comes to addressing 
breaches of the duty to bargain. An employer who refuses to 
bargain in good faith will be ordered to cease and desist from that 
conduct and nothing more; such a slap-on-the-wrist has no deterrent 
effect. 
First contract interest arbitration would, of course, obviate 
this problem in the negotiating of the initial contract. To remedy 
bad faith bargaining at other times, the NLRB should be authorized 
to award the employees the wages and benefits the employees would 
have received had the employer bargained in good faith or, 
alternatively, to impose a labor agreement retroactive to the date 
of the infraction. Punitive damages or fines, attorney fee awards, 
and debarment also should be available remedies. 
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5. Equalizing the Economic Weapons Available to the Parties 
— In labor negotiations, "economic force" — that is the ability 
of one party to inflict economic harm on the other — determines 
each party's leverage in negotiations, and such force is a "prime 
motive power for reaching agreements."13 Current law places 
virtually no constraints on what employers can do to exert economic 
pressure on their employees while imposing severe limitations on 
the economic weapons available to employees. 
This Commission has viewed the striker replacement issue as 
outside of its mandate. But there are a number of other steps that 
can and should be take to redress the imbalance of power created by 
current law. * 
(a) The statutory prohibition on secondary boycotts which was 
added in 1947 should be repealed. In our economy businesses are 
increasingly unlikely to be free standing entities but rather to be 
one part of an interdependent, interrelated set of creditors, 
suppliers, contractors and the like. Yet NLRA § 8(b)(4) seeks to 
artificially constrict labor disputes to a single "primary" 
employer and treats all other businesses as "neutrals" essentially 
without regard to the inter-relationships between the businesses. 
Employees of the primary employer are thus largely prohibited from 
making common cause with the employees or customers of businesses 
on which that employer depends, and the primary employer is largely 
immunized from economic pressure aimed at cutting off lifelines to 
the employer such as credit, contracts, etc. 
13Insurance Agents v. NLRB. 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). 
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To make matters worse, the NLRB and the courts have drawn the 
primary/secondary distinction essentially without regard to its 
purpose — to the protection of neutrals in disputes not their own. 
Thus, for example, a parent can be deemed a neutral vis a vis its 
subsidiary; a general contractor and its sub-contractor on a common 
jobsite are deemed neutrals with respect to each other; and a 
building or property owner is a neutral with respect to contractors 
it hires and can fire. 
The NLRA could be interpreted or amended to give a more 
realistic meaning to the concept of "neutralityw so as to cover 
only businesses wholly unconnected to the primary employer. In our 
view, however, especially given the employer's privilege to break 
a primary strike by hiring replacement workers, employees who 
cannot reach an agreement with their employer should be wholly free 
to make common cause with their fellows at other workplaces and 
with consumers who share the employees' concerns. The Railway 
Labor Act does not include a prohibition or secondary activity nor 
did the original Wagner Act, and this section ought to be removed 
from the NLRA. 
(b) The Act should be interpreted or amended so as to 
preclude employers from hiring temporary replacements if the 
employer elects to lock-out its employees. In a lockout, the 
incumbent employees, by definition, are prepared to continue 
working under the current terms of employment; if the employer is 
unwilling to accept their services the employer should not be free 
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to hire a new workforce. This was the rule until the NLRB held 
otherwise eight years ago.14 
(c) The Act should be interpreted or amended to require an 
employer, if a bargaining impasse is reached, either to implement 
is final offer in toto or to maintain the status quo. Employers 
should not be able — as is presently permissible — to pick and 
choose parts of the final offer to implement. 
(d) Restrictions on the primary strike should be removed. 
The NLRB has held, with Supreme Court approval, that union members 
who participate in a decision to strike and who then act to break 
the strike cannot be subject to union discipline if the members 
"resign" from the union before returning to work.15 That ruling 
should be legislatively reversed. 
6. Preventing Employers From Escaping Bargaining 
Relationships and Contractual Obligations — Under current law, 
employers are readily able to escape bargaining relationships 
and/or contractual obligations by the artifices of corporate 
restructuring or work relocation. A series of legal changes is 
needed to protect ongoing bargaining relationships and bargaining 
agreements: 
(a) The Supreme Court has held that when the assets of an 
organized workplace is sold to a new entity which continues the 
operation, the successor is not bound by the collective bargaining 
14Harter Equipment Inc., 280 NLRB 597 (1986), enf'd sub nom. 
IUOE Local 825 v. NLRB. 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987). 
15Pattem Makers v. NLRB. 473 U.S. 95 (1985). 
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agreement regardless of its terms, and the successor is not even 
obligated to bargain with the union for a new contract unless a 
majority of the successor's workforce is drawn from the 
predecessor's employees.16 (The opposite rule applies if ownership 
of the business is transferred through a stock sale.) This 
potentially makes organized businesses more attractive to would-be-
purchasers (who have the possibility of operating without a union) 
than to existing owners thereby creating an economic incentive for 
organized employers to sell out (through asset sales) and for 
successors to refuse to hire the predecessor's employees. The law 
should be amended so as to require that the collective agreement 
and the bargaining relationship continue with vrespect to a 
successor employer who maintains (or resumes) the predecessor's 
operation, regardless of the form of the sale. In addition, in 
successorship situations — including situations in which one 
contractor is substituted for another — the employees of the 
predecessor should have priority hiring rights for new jobs with 
the successor. 
(b) Under current NLRB law, a second way organized employers 
can escape bargaining and contractual obligations is to transfer 
that work to another, unorganized facility of the same employer or 
of an affiliated employer. Employers should not be permitted to 
relocate bargaining unit work during the term of a bargaining 
agreement as a means of avoiding performing the work under the 
agreed-upon terms. And, after the expiration of the contract, if 
16Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employeesf 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
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bargaining unit work is so transferred the bargaining duty should 
follow the work. 
(c) A third evasive tactic available under current law is the 
creation during the term of a collective bargaining agreement of a 
non-union entity to perform the same type of work as an organized 
entity and to serve the same market. Where that occurs, both 
entities should be deemed to be a single employer and the 
collective bargaining agreement should extend to both "breasts" of 
the employer. 
(d) In addition to these devices, current law permits 
employers to withdraw recognition based upon a "good faith doubt" 
of the union's continuing majority status. This is true even 
though employers are not obligated to extend recognition to a union 
where the union's majority status is beyond doubt. The good faith 
doubt rule should be administratively or legislatively overturned 
so that bargaining relationships can continue unless the employees 
act to decertify their representative. 
V. The Building and Construction Industry 
The NLRA system of representation presupposes a stable 
employment relationship and stable complement of employees within 
which organizing and bargaining can take place. In the 1959 
amendments to the NLRA, Congress recognized that this model does 
not fit the building and construction industry because employment 
in that industry is largely casual in nature. In this industry, if 
employees are to participate in shaping the terms of their 
employment, they must be free to organize into unions outside of 
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the employment relationship, and negotiate "pre-hire" contracts 
which establish the terms on which employees will be hired and 
future work will be performed. 
NLRA § 8(f) and the "construction industry proviso" to § 8(e) 
were intended to create — or more precisely to authorize the 
continuation — of such a system of labor relations. Both of those 
provisions have been systematically weakened by the NLRB and the 
courts and are no longer fit to accomplish their purpose. The 
following changes should be made in the law: 
1. Prohibit Employers From Evading Their Agreements Through 
"Double Breasting" — Because construction contractors are 
generally small employers with low capital, it is easy enough for 
an organized entity to establish a non-union entity during the term 
of a collective bargaining agreement. The NLRB has held that when 
that happens, the non-union entity is not subject to obligations 
under the collective bargaining agreement.17 That creates an 
enormous incentive for "double breasting." This incentive should 
be removed — administratively or statutorily — by treating the 
two entities as a single employer and subjecting that employer to 
the collective bargaining agreement it voluntarily entered into. 
2. Enforce the Recognition Clause of A Pre-Hire Agreement — 
Organized construction employers which do not wish to go through 
the trouble of double breasting have a second way of escaping the 
union: they can wait until their agreement expires and then 
renounce the bargaining relationship. In any other industry this 
17Peter Kiewit Sons. 231 NLRB 76 (1977) 
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would be unlawful because once an employer extends voluntary 
recognition to a union that recognition continues even after the 
agreement itself expires. But the NLRB, with court approval, has 
held that construction industry employers are free to discontinue 
the bargaining relationship at the end of the contract, and that 
the unionized employees cannot even exert economic pressure against 
the employer to preserve their work.18 This ruling, if not 
administratively reversed, should be legislatively overturned by 
giving pre-hire agreements the same legal status as an agreement 
with a majority representative under NLRA § 9(a) and by allowing 
pre-hire agreements to be repudiated only through a decertification 
election procedure. v 
3. Protect Agreements to Secure or Preserve Work — Because 
of the nature of construction employment, agreements by those who 
let construction contracts to do business only with contractors who 
have entered into a collective bargaining agreement are an 
essential element of the system. The secondary boycott provision 
largely prevents building trades unions from exerting economic 
pressure to secure such agreements; this is one of the reasons that 
§ 8(b)(4) needs to be modified or repealed. 
Even voluntary agreements to do business only with union 
contractors are subject to challenge under NLRA § 8(e), the "hot 
cargo"1 provision of the Act. That section contains a "construction 
industry proviso" designed to protect such agreements but the 
18John Deklewa & Sons. 282 NLRB 1375 (1987), enf'd sub nom. 
Ironworkers Local 3 v. NLRB. 843 F2d 776 (3d Cir.) 
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proviso applies only to agreements with "construction employers." 
Today the key management entity is often the owner, the developer 
or a construction manager rather than the traditional general 
contractor. The proviso to § 8(e) prohibition itself should be 
clarified accordingly. In addition, the § 8(e) prohibition should 
be interpreted or modified so as not to be triggered by 
construction agreements aimed at preserving work for area labor 
pools since such agreements are not secondary in nature. 
VI. The Contingent Workforce 
As the Commission has recognized, the "contingent workforce" 
encompasses a number of different, non-traditional work 
relationships including part-time employment, temporary employment, 
contract employment, and employment by a nominal employer such as 
a leasing firm. The NLRA representation system is not well suited 
to any of these forms of relationships and each requires its own 
set of adaptations. 
Some of the proposals outlined above — such as the 
recommendation to facilitate bargaining above the level of the 
individual bargaining unit and the recommendation to permit 
concerted activity aimed at entities other than the immediate 
employing entity — would be a start toward bringing the labor law 
more in line with the needs of contingent workers. Other measures 
are needed, in addition, if this aim is to be realized. 
To briefly summarize our prior proposals to the Commission, we 
advocate the follow changes: 
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1. The definition of "employee" should be amended to cover 
contract workers who may not be common-law employees of a business 
but are in a position analogous to employees in their dealings with 
the business. 
2. The definition of "joint employer" should be amended to 
cover workers who are nominally employed by one legal entity but 
whose terms of employment are effectively controlled by another. 
This would include employees of temporary help agencies, leased 
employees, and employees of service contractors. Employees would 
be permitted to organize along with the other employees of the 
joint employer and to bargain with and engage in lawful concerted 
* activities with respect to the joint employer. 
3. To enable individuals who work on a casual or free-lance 
basis for multiple employers (as is true, for example, in the 
entertainment industry) to participate in shaping the terms of 
their employment, § 8(f) — and the amendments outlined above to 
effectuate that section — should be extended to protect pre-hire 
agreements in all industries. 
4. The economic incentives for shifting work from permanent 
to part-time, temporary, or contract workers should be eliminated 
by (i) equalizing wages and benefits across all classes of workers 
doing equal work for an employer; (ii) counting all types of 
employees in determining the coverage of federal employment laws; 
and (iii) imposing obligation on those businesses which contract 
with others for services to assure compliance with employment laws 
in the delivery of those services. 
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VII. Fair Share Obligations 
Union representation offers a classic example of a collective 
good: at least within any given bargaining unit, the benefit 
cannot be confined to those who choose to support the union but 
rather by its nature runs to all employees. That creates the 
classic free-rider problem: it is in the economic self-interest of 
any individual employee to refrain from funding the union in the 
hopes of deriving the benefit available to all bargaining unit 
members without paying the cost of producing those benefits. 
The solution to this problem is, of course, to obligate every 
employee within the unit to pay a fair share of the costs of 
producing the collective good. That is what union security clauses 
do. But NLRA § 14(b) authorizes states to prohibit such agreements 
and where states do so there is no constraint on free riderism. 
Whatever justification may have once existed for that section 
has completely collapsed in light of the Supreme Court's decision 
that the NLRA does not permit unions to require unwilling workers 
to join a union or to fund all of the union's activities but only 
allows union security agreements which require support for those 
expenses germane to bargaining and contract administration. 
The NLRA should be amended to follow the Railway Labor Act and 
displace the so-called state right to work laws. Absent repeal of 
S 14(b), union security agreements which require payment of full 
union dues should be permitted. 
